



Conflict Alert 2016

# Violence in the Bangsamoro and Southern Mindanao

Emerging Actors and New Sites of Conflict  
2011-2015



Peace  
is within  
our power



# **Violence in the Bangsamoro and Southern Mindanao:**

Emerging Actors and  
New Sites of Violence  
2011–2015

October 2016

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We dedicate this report to community leaders, peacebuilders and local government officials in the areas covered by this report. We know the difficulties of confronting conflict and violence, particularly between families, neighbours and clans, and making sure that residents can go about their everyday lives in peace. Truly, peace is within our power.

## Conflict Alert Team

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# Contents

<b>6</b>	Foreword
<b>8</b>	List of figures, tables, boxes and maps
<b>10</b>	Abbreviations
<b>11</b>	Executive summary
<b>14</b>	Introduction
<b>16</b>	Methods, sources, and processes of the conflict monitoring system
<b>21</b>	Surging violence and shifting terrains: The dynamics and costs of violent conflict in Mindanao
<b>46</b>	Conclusions and policy implications

## **Annex**

<b>51</b>	Annex A: Data tables
<b>59</b>	Annex B: Sample Map Overlays

# Foreword

**A**cross society in the Philippines, people are redoubling their peacebuilding efforts as the window opens to end the decades-old conflicts in Mindanao and other parts of the Philippines. The government is pursuing the passage of an enabling law to finally create the Bangsamoro region and to hasten a political settlement with communist rebels.

The developmental challenges are awesome. Certainly they cannot be fully addressed without a secure, peaceful settlement to rebellion and insurgency in the most impoverished and disadvantaged regions of the Philippines—both of which are in Mindanao.

Many people, with whom we work for a peaceful and prosperous Philippines, have stressed the importance of detailed information with real-time data that can track violent conflict, shed light on its causes, and inform peacebuilding and development strategies and activities.

That is why in 2013, Alert Philippines established the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS), a database of violent conflict in the five provinces of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, including the two cities of Cotabato in Maguindanao (Region 12 or Soccsksargen) and Isabela in Basilan (Region 9 or Zamboanga Peninsula).<sup>1</sup>

**Alert Philippines  
has now  
gathered conflict  
data for the years  
2011–2015.**


The data spans  
violence related  
to the rebels, right  
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within communities,  
showing where  
and when conflicts  
spike—or fall.

Supported by the World Bank, the Korea Trust Fund for Economic and Peace-building Transitions, and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Alert Philippines has now gathered conflict data for the years 2011–2015. The data spans violence related to the rebels, right through to fights between groups, and within communities, showing where and when conflicts spike or fall. To give just two examples: the database shows that criminal gangs are now causing as much violence as rebels; and violence peaks in the agricultural lean season or just before school starts, showing the links to poverty. Such information is invaluable for guiding policy. For instance, it was used during deliberations on the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) in the period after the 2015 Mamasapano tragedy. At that crucial time, legislators needed to understand the conflict dynamics in the region and the importance of the BBL to retire much of the rebellion-related violence. The information from the BCMS also enriches national and international conflict and development studies (Monsod, 2016; Capuno, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2016). Users of the BCMS website are in the thousands and come from diverse backgrounds such as security, agriculture, business, education, local and national governments, health, and local, national and international non-profit organizations.

<sup>1</sup> The provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi comprise the ARMM.

Seeing how the database was so well used, in mid-2015, Alert Philippines started a similar project called Southern and Eastern Mindanao Conflict Database (SEMCD) to gather data for 2011-2015 from these parts of Mindanao. Supported by the Royal Norwegian Government, the results will also be available online, integrated with the data from the BCMS into a single Mindanao database, called Conflict Alert, with improved graphics and mapping facilities. The availability of conflict data over five years covering three regions will enable people to analyse the incidence, causes and costs, and look into the statistics that reveal the real score about violence.<sup>2</sup>

I congratulate the members of the Alert Philippines team for their pioneering and innovative work. They have built a database that responds to the demands of various stakeholders for valuable conflict data. We hope that this can make its small contribution towards supporting all those who seek to improve local governance, enhance development initiatives, encourage investments and aid, and foster peacebuilding work in the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao.



**Harriet Lamb**

Chief Executive Officer  
International Alert

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<sup>2</sup> The BCMS dataset is crucial in determining the nature of violence associated with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Abu Sayyaf Group, Ansar al-Khalifah and other armed groups in the ARMM. Meanwhile, the SEMCD dataset is crucial in determining the nature of violence associated with the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army-National Democratic Front and other private armed groups.

# List of figures, tables, boxes and maps

## Figures

<b>Figure 1</b>	Proportion of violent conflict incidents to total crime volume, Davao Region and ARMM, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 2</b>	Number of violent conflict incidents by province, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 3</b>	Conflict incidence per 100,000 persons by province, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 4</b>	Conflict incidence per 1,000 square kilometers by province, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 5</b>	Number of violent conflict incidents in ARMM, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 6</b>	Number of violent conflict incidents in Davao Region, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 7</b>	Violent conflict incidents by cause and region, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 8</b>	Violent conflict incidents by cause and province, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 9</b>	Violent conflict incidents (including shadow economy issues and common crimes) by type and region, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 10</b>	Violent conflict incidents (excluding shadow economy issues and common crimes) by type and region, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 11</b>	Violent conflict incidents and deaths by cause in Davao Region and ARMM, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 12</b>	Violent conflict incidents and deaths by province, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 13</b>	Violent conflict incidents involving the BIFF and Abu Sayyaf Group in ARMM, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 14</b>	Violent conflict incidents involving the MILF in ARMM, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 15</b>	Causes and mean number of violent conflict incidents per month, ARMM, 2011–2015
<b>Figure 16</b>	Causes and mean number of violent conflict incidents per month, Davao Region, 2011–2015

## Data Tables

<b>Table 1</b>	Number of violent conflict incidents by province, 2011–2015
<b>Table 2</b>	Conflict incidence per 100,000 persons by province, 2011–2015
<b>Table 3</b>	Conflict incidence per 1,000 square kilometres by province, 2011–2015
<b>Table 4</b>	Violent conflict incidents in ARMM by year
<b>Table 5</b>	Violent conflict incidents in Davao Region by year
<b>Table 6</b>	Violent conflict incidents by cause and region, 2011–2015
<b>Table 7</b>	Violent conflict incidents by cause and province, 2011–2015
<b>Table 8</b>	Violent conflict incidents (including shadow economy issues and common crimes) by type and region, 2011–2015
<b>Table 9</b>	Violent conflict incidents (excluding shadow economy issues and common crimes) by type and region, 2011–2015
<b>Table 10</b>	Violent conflict incidents and deaths by cause in Davao Region and ARMM, 2011–2015
<b>Table 11</b>	Violent conflict incidents and deaths by province, 2011–2015
<b>Table 12</b>	Violent conflicts involving the BIFF and Abu Sayyaf Group in ARMM, 2011–2015
<b>Table 13</b>	Violent conflict incidents involving the MILF in ARMM, 2011–2015
<b>Table 14</b>	Mean number of violent conflicts per month, Davao Region and ARMM, 2011–2015

<b>Table 15</b>	Violent conflict incidents in the ARMM by cause and year
<b>Table 16</b>	Violent conflict incidents in the ARMM by specific cause and year
<b>Table 17</b>	Violent conflict incidents in Davao Region by cause and year
<b>Table 18</b>	Violent conflict incidents in Davao Region by specific cause and year
<b>Table 19</b>	Violent conflict incidents in the ARMM by shadow economy and year
<b>Table 20</b>	Violent conflict incidents in Davao Region by shadow economy and year
<b>Table 21</b>	Violent conflict incidents in ARMM by crime and year
<b>Table 22</b>	Violent conflict incidents in the Davao Region by crime and year
<b>Table 23</b>	Conflict deaths by cause, province and year in ARMM
<b>Table 24</b>	Conflict deaths by cause, province and year in Davao Region
<b>Table 25</b>	Number of insurgent-related incidents and combatants involved, 2011–2015
<b>Table 26</b>	Mean AFP–NPA clashes, by month, 2011–2015
<b>Table 27</b>	Number of incidents involving NPA rebels, by specific cause, 2011–2015
<b>Table 28</b>	Resource capture, by number and type of equipment, 2011–2015
<b>Table 29</b>	Number of incidents involving NPA rebels, by hour, 2011–2015

## Boxes

<b>Box 1</b>	Evidence from AFP conflict data
<b>Box 2</b>	The phenomenon of conflict strings
<b>Box 3</b>	Measuring the economic costs of conflict in the Philippines
<b>Box 4</b>	The threat of violent extremism
<b>Box 5</b>	Violence intensity ranking of ARMM provinces

## Maps

<b>Map 1</b>	Heatmap of violent conflict incidents in ARMM, 2011–2015
<b>Map 2</b>	Heatmap of violent conflict incidents in Davao Region, 2011–2015

# Abbreviations

<b>AFP EastMinCom</b>	Eastern Mindanao Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
<b>ARMM</b>	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
<b>VII</b>	Violence Intensity Index
<b>BBL</b>	Bangsamoro Basic Law
<b>BCMS</b>	Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System
<b>BIFF</b>	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
<b>CPP-NPA-NDF</b>	Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army-National Democratic Front
<b>CSV</b>	comma-separated values
<b>CVE</b>	countering violent extremism
<b>CVI</b>	crime, violence and instability
<b>GIS</b>	geographic information system
<b>ISIS</b>	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
<b>MILF</b>	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
<b>MNLF</b>	Moro National Liberation Front
<b>MOA</b>	memorandum of agreement
<b>MSVG</b>	multi-stakeholder validation group
<b>PNP</b>	Philippine National Police
<b>SEMCD</b>	Southern and Eastern Mindanao Conflict Database



# Executive summary

**T**he Conflict Alert monitoring system combines two previously separate databases to allow the generation of quantitative evidence and comparative statistical data that can be used to determine the actual magnitude and scope, causes and costs, trends and directions of violent conflict in three regions of Mindanao. These databases are the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System launched in 2013 that covered the provinces of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) plus the cities of Cotabato and Isabela, and the Southern and Eastern Mindanao Conflict Database, launched in 2015 that covered Caraga and the Davao Region.

This report is based on data from 2011 to 2015 gathered from the ARMM and the Davao Region. Data from Caraga is still being encoded into the system. Sources for the data were news reports from national and local newspapers, and police and military reports obtained through agreements signed respectively with the Philippine National Police and the Eastern Mindanao Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The data shows that violent conflict incidents in the Davao Region outnumbered those in the ARMM by four to one. A total of 28,325 incidents occurred in the Davao Region in contrast to 6,759 incidents in the ARMM. The top four provinces in terms of number of incidents were in the Davao Region: Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental. Maguindanao, the biggest province in the ARMM, rounded out the top five.

But in terms of conflict per person and kilometre, the configuration of the top five provinces changes. Davao del Norte became first in terms on conflict per 100,000 persons and per 1,000 square kilometres. Basilan edged out Maguindanao to be fifth. In the middle were the other provinces in the Davao Region: Compostela Valley, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental. The data indicates that the higher population in the Davao Region did not distort the scale of violence registered here when compared with the ARMM. While the real threat of violent conflict was similar in all the 10 provinces in the two regions, it was actually less frequent and less concentrated in the ARMM, which is often seen as the locus of intense and continuous violence in Mindanao.

Examining the data by year, violent conflict surged to unprecedented levels in the ARMM in 2015. There were 2,444 incidents this year, more than a third of the total number of incidents for the whole five-year period. In the Davao Region in contrast, the number of incidents slid by 7% to 5,688 in 2015 from the previous year.

The data shows that  
**violent conflict incidents in the Davao Region outnumbered those in the ARMM by four to one.**

The surge in the ARMM was due to higher political and extremist violence, especially after the Mamasapano tragedy in January 2015. At the same time, shadow economy-related conflicts and common crimes stayed high. In the Davao Region, most of the conflicts stemmed from common crimes. While actual numbers fell, they stayed high while a surge in identity-related (mostly gender issues) and shadow economy conflicts offset the decrease.

Violent conflict in the ARMM was intimately related with the operation of shadow economies, especially the manufacture and trade of illegal weapons and illicit drugs. In the Davao Region, violent conflict was characterized by high levels of common crimes such robberies, alcohol-related violence, and civilian- and community-level disputes over land and other resources in urban or peri-urban areas.

The scale of violence reported in the cities and towns of the ARMM and the Davao Region pointed to the evolving role of cities, towns and other urbanizing areas as theatres of violence. Heatmaps showed for instance that conflict incidence was highest in the urban centres of Cotabato City, Islamic City of Marawi, Parang and Malabang in the ARMM mainland, and in the cities of Tagum and Panabo in Davao del Norte. Conflicts also converged in poor yet less disadvantaged areas rather than in areas that are extremely poor. In Compostela Valley, the municipalities of Nabunturan, Mabini, Maragusan, Asuncion and Carmen, which are either first or second class based on average annual income, showed a high concentration of conflicts.

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Classifying violent conflict incidents by type showed more horizontal conflict (between clans and ethnic groups, between rival insurgents) than vertical conflict (separatist or non-separatist struggles against the state). Removing common crimes and shadow-related conflicts, which could be part of governance-induced conflict, from total conflict incidence uncovered the significance of political, rebellion-related conflict.

Political causes and identity issues easily eclipsed the magnitude of violence associated with common crimes, shadow economies and issues related to governance from 2011-2015 in the ARMM and Davao Region. The higher human costs emanating from political and identity-related violence must be considered, in the first instance, as the key determinant of developmental, law enforcement, and peacebuilding priorities and initiatives, rather than the levels of conflict incidence per se.

Looking at the number of conflict deaths by province, one could see that Maguindanao and Sulu were deadliest compared to the other provinces in the ARMM and Davao Region. Clashes between government forces and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) based in Maguindanao and the Abu Sayyaf based in Sulu had increased. Meanwhile, violence linked to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fell as its ceasefire agreement with the government continued to hold despite the Mamasapano tragedy that claimed the lives of some of its members.

Factions of the BIFF and Abu Sayyaf have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). They and other extremist groups that have lately emerged such as the Maute Group and Ansar al-Khalifah based respectively in Lanao del Sur and Sarangani are newly evolving risks and emerging threats to growth and stability in Mindanao.

The temporal characteristics of conflict in the ARMM show spikes in conflict incidents during elections, the period of Ramadan, before the start of a new schoolyear in June and during the lean months before the harvest of the main season rice crop between September and October. In the Davao Region, common crimes and shadow economy-related violence increased from December to March and declined in April and May. The AFP data made available for this study showed the month of March to be particularly violent especially in the days before and after March 29, the founding anniversary of the New People's Army.

All these findings underscore the urgency of coming up with a meaningful and inclusive Bangsamoro Basic Law and a final political settlement with communist rebels. Costs from political violence in terms of deaths could be drastically reduced by retiring the armed struggles of the MILF, the Moro National Liberation Front, and the New People's Army.

A law establishing the Bangsamoro is also expected to stem the exodus of disillusioned MILF and BIFF combatants to ISIS-directed armed groups. A peace agreement with communist rebels will have knock-on effects on the scale of violence associated with resource capture and inter- and intra-lumad violence.

In dealing with vertical conflict the government and other stakeholders must not neglect the newly emerging threats arising from criminal activity. Crime is on the rise and more so in those aspects that are intertwined with Mindanao's many shadow enterprises, emphasizing the need for effective peacebuilding strategies that address the links between multiple causes of violence.

Finally, violent conflict is turning into a clearly urban or peri-urban phenomenon even in the poorest provinces of Mindanao. Peacebuilding initiatives targeting crime, violence and instability in the cities and towns must be given prominence and the same emphasis that is given to rebellion and political contestation. Development and aid agencies must invest more in research, conflict monitoring, and peacebuilding advocacy and action in the major cities and municipalities of Mindanao.



# Introduction

**T**he year 2016 marks the launch of Conflict Alert, which combines data on violent conflict in the Bangsamoro and the southern and eastern regions of Mindanao. Conflict Alert is a database and monitoring system of violent conflict in 15 provinces from three regions in the southern Philippines—regions that are often described as major sites of rebellion and insurgency, identity-based conflict, resource conflict, and criminal violence.<sup>3</sup>

The new system generates and provides the quantitative evidence and comparative statistical data that can be used to determine the actual magnitude and scope, causes and costs, trends and directions of violent conflict in three regions of Mindanao.

The new system also offers much improved ArcGIS-generated maps<sup>4</sup> of violent conflict that can be used to overlay other maps (political, land use, ancestral domain areas, investments, aid, etc.) for easier and deeper comparative analysis and understanding of the drivers and sources of violent conflict. The system actually enables users to generate real-time conflict “heat signatures” from the village to the provincial level.

The database is sourced from two earlier sets of panel data established by Alert Philippines. In 2013, Alert Philippines launched a conflict database and monitoring system called the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS). The BCMS initially contained data for 2011–2013, which served as the basis for a general report on violent conflict in the ARMM that was launched in 2014.<sup>5</sup> The database was eventually updated with 2014 and 2015 data.

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three regions in the  
southern Philippines

In 2015, Alert Philippines launched the Southern and Eastern Mindanao Conflict Database (SEMCD) project to construct a similar database and monitoring system for violent conflict in the southern (Davao Region) and eastern (Caraga region) provinces of Mindanao. The SEMCD has kept pace with the BCMS as five years (2011–2015) of conflict data have also been gathered from these regions. The data from the Davao region have been encoded and analysed while the data from the five provinces of Caraga are still being encoded.

For easier use and deeper comparative analysis, both the BCMS and SEMCD conflict databases have been combined into a single integrated database called Conflict Alert. The system has been upgraded to ensure validity and reliability of data as well as end-user satisfaction. At the same time, an enhanced website has been created where the two databases can be accessed.

<sup>3</sup> The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, also referred to as the Bangsamoro region; the Davao Region, also referred to as southern Mindanao region; and the Caraga region, also referred to as the eastern Mindanao region.

<sup>4</sup> ArcGIS is software used to produce maps.

<sup>5</sup> International Alert, *Rebellion, Political Violence and Shadow Crimes in the Bangsamoro: The Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS), 2011–2013*, August 2014.

The new conflict monitoring system is funded by the World Bank, the Korea Trust Fund for Economic and Peace-building Transitions, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Royal Norwegian Government, and International Alert UK.

The first part of this general report presents the new and advanced features of the conflict monitoring system and its limitations. The second part provides descriptive statistics on the geographical and temporal incidence of violent conflict, typologies and causes of violent conflict, and the human costs of conflict. The third and last part presents the conclusions and policy implications from the analysis of conflict data. Three analytical studies about (a) the phenomenon of conflict strings; (b) conflict insights from military data; and (c) the phenomenon of violent extremism are also included in the report. Finally, the report includes a presentation of the Violence Intensity Index (VII) that was developed by Alert Philippines in 2014 and an excerpt from a proposed framework for calculating economic losses from conflict.



# Methods, sources, and processes of the conflict monitoring system



**T**he BCMS general report highlighted the various features of the conflict monitoring system, including the methodology employed and data limitations, the process flowchart, the sourcing of data, the data audit and quality control features, and the conflict typologies and causal categories used. Some of the features and the explanations about how the conflict monitoring system operates remain the same and can be found in Conflict Alert website.<sup>6</sup>

However, significant changes have also been undertaken and built into the new system. The upgraded Conflict Alert website contains the following enhanced qualities and features:

## Longer coverage and broader scope

Conflict Alert has generated five years (2011–2015) of panel data on violent conflict covering the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). It also includes incidents of conflict in the cities of Isabela, Basilan and Cotabato City that are geographically located within the ARMM but are administratively and politically separated from it.

Conflict Alert also contains voluminous conflict data from 2011 to 2015 from the provinces of Davao Oriental, Davao Occidental, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur and Compostela Valley in the Davao



Region.<sup>7</sup> Data from the provinces of Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte, Surigao del Sur, Surigao del Norte and Dinagat Islands in the Caraga are presently being encoded into the system.

## Upgraded and enhanced monitoring instrument

The monitoring instrument that was used to encode data into the database has been technically improved and upgraded to generate data on strings of violence, weapons used in conflict, and the results of dispute resolution initiatives undertaken by local groups. Previous encumbrances in the data entry process were removed through the creation of a new stepwise data entry process that mimics the order and flow of information that can be found in police and media reports.

## New sources of data

Additional sources of data have been uncovered from both the multi-stakeholder validation groups (MSVGs) and Philippine military. MSVG read-outs that contain additional data on violence, or a determination of conflict causes, were added to the database, as well as discrete incident reports of violent conflict monitored by the Eastern Mindanao Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP EastMinCom).

The AFP EastMinCom supplied data under a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with Alert Philippines. The agreement enabled access to sensitive military data with specific confidentiality and data usage clauses. A similar MOA with the Philippine National Police (PNP) was secured to ensure regular access to police incident reports in the said regions. Data from the Department on Social Welfare and Development on displacement and hospital reports that can provide additional sources of data on gender-based violence and human costs have been accessed and are currently being examined in terms of quality and reliability before being incorporated into the database.

## New causal categories

New causal categories have been added to the conflict typologies used in both the BCMS and SEMCD conflict databases. There are now 67 causal sub-categories under the six main categories used in the database, with additional sub-categories added to governance-related conflict (e.g., military and other related security operations), political conflict (extremist violence), and resource conflict (rebel resource capture).<sup>8</sup>

The previous use of the “extra-judicial” conflict terminology has been replaced with “common crimes” in keeping with the nomenclature often used in police and media reports. Another critical modification is the segregation of cases of rape and other forms of gender-based violence and their transfer from common crimes to identity-related conflict.

A separate workbook-cum-toolkit on conflict typologies and categories is being prepared for publication and will also be available on the Conflict Alert website.

<sup>7</sup> Davao Occidental was created only in 2013 but data for the five-year period was successfully harvested from the five municipalities that now comprise the province.

<sup>8</sup> The latter is particularly significant due to the rising incidence of rebel attacks against enterprises engaged in the construction of roads and other infrastructure, mining and agribusiness, including reports of forced payments or extortion activities of criminal groups.

## CSV availability for STATA and SPSS

Five years of conflict data generated by the system is available in comma-separated values or CSV format, which can run on Stata and SPSS, enabling simple and complex statistical tests to be performed. Several tests have already been undertaken since the system was established in 2013, including the links between conflict and good governance and conflict (Alert, 2015) and human development inputs (Monsod, 2016).

## Tracing strings of violence and morphing

The new system enables the administrator to trace potential strings of violent conflict, including the morphing of conflict actors and causes from one category to another.<sup>9</sup> However, public access to the source materials remains restricted because the identification and determination of strings often depend on real identities and specific sites where violence occurs—the sort of data that are redacted from the database.

The new system builds upon the multi-causal encoding of conflict that enabled previous users to see the links between causes of violence and the morphing of identities and causes across time and space. In future iterations of the database, causal combinations from strings of violence and morphing outcomes will also be available in CSV format.

## Enhanced ArcGIS mapping system and partner capacity building

The clarity and manageability of the GIS mapping system have been improved with the use of the more comprehensive ArcGIS system. Alert has downloaded into the monitoring system other relevant maps that can be overlaid on the base map such as conflict maps, maps of ancestral domain claims and awards, maps of rivers and other water resources, mining tenement maps, political and administrative maps, and geological and terrain maps. Samples of these maps are in Annex B.

Capacity building to enable easier and regular use of the mapping system has also been given to the relevant agencies of the PNP, select local government units, and partner academic institutions.

## 24-7 website access

A new and more informative website has been created that is easier to use. Access to the website is assured 24-7.

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<sup>9</sup> Conflict strings refer to episodes of violence that are linked to each other and may extend or expand through linear or parallel pathways.

## Limitations of the conflict monitoring system

Some limitations indicated in the launch of the BCMS in 2014 and the SEMCD in 2015 have been addressed, including the (a) improvement in the categories and sub-categories of violent conflict; (b) better access to data from places adjacent to the ARMM; (c) enhanced capability to conduct comparative analysis with the inclusion of comparator regions (southern and eastern Mindanao) to the Bangsamoro; and, (d) the identification of new sources of violent conflict.

However, some of the earlier limitations are reiterated in this study. These include the following:

**(a)** Alert's cautionary preface that not all data on violent conflict is publicly reported or easily accessible. This statement holds true despite the robustness of data in the system compared to any other subnational or national database in the Philippines.

For example, vital military data that was successfully gathered and incorporated into the SEMCD accounted for at least 2% of the total number of violent conflict incidents in the Davao region, yet only 16% of the data is in police and media reports. This underscores the importance of access to military data. It is important to note that the same access to military data in the SEMCD is not matched with similar access to military data in the BCMS, indicating that a significant number of incidents documented by the military may have been left out in the latter.

**(b)** The determination of economic costs remains a work in progress. However, Alert is aided by a new framework for determining economic costs that has been developed and included in this report (Ramos, 2016).

**(c)** The data on evacuation and displacement that is critical in determining the AVII remains inadequate in police, military and media reports, and more so in Mindanao's eastern and southern corridor. The data gap is compensated for by the robust reports available from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.<sup>10</sup>

**(d)** Data on gender-related violence remains inadequate and where they are available may be grossly underestimated. Despite some progress in generating gender and violence data in the SEMCD, the same does not hold true for the BCMS. The system is still unable to gain better access to quantitative and statistical data on gender-based violence because of privacy and confidentiality rules governing access to these information.

<sup>10</sup> Protection Cluster, Mindanao Displacement Dashboard, 2012–2015. The Protection Cluster is co-led by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Department of Social Welfare and Development.



PREMIER MOTORS  
**NORANIA**


ILIGAN  
BALO-I

ILIGAN-MSU MARWIK & YK

VAS-473  
ILOCOS REGION

ALHAMDULILLAH and Congratulate  
**DR. MOHAMMAD NAWLAH DIMARO**  
OUR NEW LADY PHYSICIAN






# Surging violence and shifting terrains:

The dynamics and costs of  
violent conflict in Mindanao


There were close to 70,000 conflict incidents in the ARMM and Davao Region from 2011 to 2015, of which more than half (35,084) were considered violent incidents and were subjected to analysis. With 28,325 incidents occurring in the Davao Region alone, in contrast to 6,759 incidents in the entire ARMM, one can see that the scale of violence in the former easily outstripped the latter by four to one (Figure 1).

**Figure 1.** Proportion of violent conflict incidents to total crime volume, Davao Region and ARMM, 2011–2015



A regional comparison of the numbers will show at the outset that contrary to popular perceptions, violent conflict is more widespread and the magnitude greater in regions outside the ARMM, even if we account for population and density (see below). Indeed, conflict incidence in the four provinces of the Davao Region accounted for 81% of the violence reported in the two regions under study. These four provinces and the province of Maguindanao in the ARMM were the top five provinces in terms of violent conflict incidents (Figure 2).

**Figure 2.** Number of violent conflict incidents by province, 2011–2015







### Conflict per capita and per kilometre

When measured in terms of conflict per capita and per square kilometre,<sup>11</sup> the southern Mindanao provinces still came out on top with Davao del Norte now placing ahead of Davao del Sur. In the case of the ARMM, the island province of Basilan overtook Maguindanao in terms of per-100,000 persons and per-1,000 square kilometre violence and landed in the top five of 10 provinces studied in terms of conflict per capita and kilometre (Figures 3-4).

**Figure 3.** Conflict incidence per 100,000 persons by province, 2011-2015



**Figure 4.** Conflict incidence per 1,000 square kilometres by province, 2011-2015



<sup>11</sup> Conflict per capita is measured by getting the mean average of violent conflict incidents from 2011 to 2015 over the 2015 population of each province (using a 2% annual growth rate) and multiplying it by 100,000. Using the latest population figure prevents double counting in terms of incidence among population and across years. Conflict density is the quotient of the mean average of violent conflict incidents from 2011 to 2015 over land area of each province multiplied by 1,000.

## Box 1 | Evidence from AFP conflict data

**In 2015,** the Eastern Mindanao Command (EastMinCom) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) provided access to International Alert Philippines to its data on violent conflict, which could be used to assess the distinct impact of incidents involving the military on the prospects for a lasting peace in Mindanao.

We jumped on the offer because previous iterations of the Conflict Alert monitoring system had been criticized for failing to include documented incidents of violent conflict monitored and gathered by the military. The presumption was that military accounts of conflict were not included in police incident reports, and we were thus missing out on a significant trove of incidents that could shape assessments of the causes and costs of conflict where military units were involved, including their temporal and geographical characteristics.

In the course of this brief partnership, Alert Philippines shared data on conflict that was available in police and media reports while the AFP shared data on incidents of violence surrounding military and insurgent clashes, ambushes, hostage-taking, including cases of harassment and executions from both sides of the conflict divide.

Alert Philippines discovered the richness of data, deep analysis, and technical sophistication that the EastMinCom possessed in conflict monitoring. We also saw how the EastMinCom had used sophisticated software to map out violent incidents and developed heatmaps to inform the rank-and-file about the theatre for war making, as well as the priority areas for peacemaking and development intervention. The reports shared to us were declassified, that is, the names of actors and of specific villages were redacted.

It seems that the critique about the inadequacy of conflict monitoring without access to military records was well founded. We discovered that only 16% of EastMinCom reports were found in police reports, revealing a high percentage of incidents that were not being documented by agencies mandated to do so. We agreed that in the future this inadequacy could be addressed if the military and its various commands would continue providing data to Alert, and if the insurgent hierarchy of the New People's Army (NPA) would, in the future, do the same.

We discovered that

**only 16% of EastMinCom reports were found in police reports,**


revealing a high percentage of incidents that were not being documented by agencies mandated to do so.

### • **Mostly insurgency-related**

• The data was focused on incidents of insurgent-related violence. EastMinCom was able to capture data on the violent actions of both sides in the long war between the government and communist rebels in the Davao Region—presently covered by Conflict Alert—and in the Caraga and SOCCSKSARGEN regions, and the province of Misamis Oriental. These areas comprise the EastMinCom's entire coverage area. The data also disclosed how the AFP remained focused on insurgent and criminal groups, or internal threats, rather than on external threats to the country.


• The data showed the continuing importance of insurgent and military-related incidents, averaging around 295 incidents a year, or around 25 incidents a month. The peak of insurgent activity was in 2013, when an average of 13 rebel combatants were involved in various hostile actions with military and paramilitary groups. By 2015 this figure went down to an average of eight combatants involved in hostile actions.

**Figure A. Number of insurgent-related incidents and combatants involved, 2011-2015**





The data also showed that while certain periods of the year were rife with non-military attacks by communist rebels, such as in the first quarter of the year leading to just before the anniversary of the founding of the NPA in March, most attacks perpetrated by the NPA remained focused against the state and the military. Hence, rebellion-related vertical violence dominated the sort of violence associated with resource capture.

**Figure B. Mean AFP-NPA clashes, by month, 2011-2015**




The EastMinCom data provided partial but detailed accounts of economic losses due to insurgent activity and military action and reaction. From 2011 to 2015, the cost of equipment and infrastructure destroyed in the course of the conflict, or in some cases confiscated by the insurgents, amounted to nearly P300 million. The most favoured target for attack were trucks, backhoes, and gold mining equipment.

**Figure C. Number of incidents involving NPA rebels, by specific cause, 2011–2015****Figure D. Resource capture, by number and type of equipment, 2011–2015**

Finally, the data provided the temporal characteristics of war-making and rebellion. Clashes and armed activities by both groups on a monthly basis peak in March when the communist rebels launch various tactical offensives to celebrate the founding of the NPA.

According to the data provided by the military and calculated by Alert, it would also seem that most clashes occur during dawn and dusk, or precisely between 4 and 5 a.m. and 7 and 9 p.m.

**Figure E. Number of incidents involving NPA rebels, by hour, 2011–2015**

ATTY. NASIB D. YASIN  
NEWLY APPOINTED REGIONAL ELECTION SUPERVISOR LAMPUNG DEL SUR  
COMPLIMENTS NY: COMELICA  
ATTY. RAY F. SUMALPANO, CPA, CSEE  
LONG LIVE A. COMBATANTS  
NEWLY APPOINTED REGIONAL ELECTION SUPERVISOR LAMPUNG DEL SUR  
COMPLIMENTS NY: COMELICA




The data indicates that the higher population in the Davao provinces did not distort the scale of violence registered in the region when compared with the ARMM data. While the real threat of violent conflict was similar in all the 10 provinces studied, it was actually less frequent and less concentrated in the ARMM, which is often seen as the locus of intense and continuous violence in Mindanao.


### Surge in violence

Violent conflict surged to unprecedented levels in the ARMM in 2015. The surge is underscored by the fact that more than a third of all registered cases of violent conflict over a five-year period occurred in 2015 (Figure 5). Meanwhile, there was a slight decrease in violence in the Davao provinces in 2015, when the number of incidents fell by around 7% from the year before (Figure 6).

**Figure 5.** Number of violent conflict incidents in ARMM, 2011–2015



**Figure 6.** Number of violent conflict incidents in Davao Region, 2011–2015



The surge in violence in the Bangsamoro may be attributed to newly emerging risks impinging upon the previous sources or causes of violent conflict—shadow economy activities and common crimes. Violence surged in 2015 owing to new factors that had little to do with oft-cited political conflict sub-



categories such as rebellion and political competition. The expected fallout in violence following the Mamasapano tragedy— a botched police operation in January 2015 that claimed the lives of more than 60 police commandos, Moro rebels and civilians—led to an increase in political conflict as well as extremist violence (up by 37%), but these were not enough to exceed the violence associated with shadow economies and common crimes. (See Tables 15 to 16 in Annex A).

Most of the violence in the Davao Region came from common crimes, shadow economy- and identity-related conflict. The decrease in conflict incidents in 2015 came from a slide in common crimes, but this was mainly offset by a surge in identity-related (up by 57% due to gender-related issues) and shadow economy-related conflicts (up by 34% from gun and drug-related violence). (See Table 17 to 18 in Annex A).

An increase in violent conflict due to the *lumad*<sup>12</sup> wars—conflict between *lumad* groups for and against mining with the involvement of insurgents—and its consequent human costs in the second half of 2015 was observed in the data. However, the spike in identity-based conflict that was reported was due to an increase in gender-related violence, rather than from the violence associated with inter and intra-tribal conflict.

### Causes of violent conflict

More than half of the cases of violent conflict in the monitoring system included a determination of causes in their incident reports. Fifty-seven percent (57%) of the ARMM reports and 53% of the Davao Region reports indicated the actual cause of conflict.

As is often the case, the police incident reports offered scale but often scant or minute descriptions of causes. The explanatory gaps in police reports were mitigated by the more descriptive media reports that enabled a more detailed accounting of the singular or multiple causes of violent conflict.

**The nature of violent conflict in the ARMM is intimately related with the operation of shadow economies.**

Meanwhile, violent conflict in the Davao Region is characterized by high levels of common crimes.

The causes of the conflicts continue to be classified according to six categories: political issues, identity issues, resource issues, governance issues, shadow economy issues, and common crimes.<sup>13</sup> These causes were further screened and evaluated using 67 sub-categories.

One immediately sees the nature of violent conflict in the ARMM to be intimately related with the operation of shadow economies (Figure 7), especially in the manufacture and trade of illegal weapons and illicit drugs. (See Table 19 in Annex A). Meanwhile, violent conflict in the Davao Region is characterized by high levels of common crimes such robberies, alcohol-related violence, and civilian- and community-level disputes over land and other resources in urban or peri-urban areas. (See Table 22 in Annex A).

<sup>12</sup> The *lumad* are the indigenous peoples in Mindanao.

<sup>13</sup> See page 18 of the report, *Rebellion, Political Violence and Shadow Crimes in the Bangsamoro: The Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS), 2011–2013*, for the definition and explanation of the six categories. Note that rape has been reclassified as an identity issue.

## Box 2 | The phenomenon of conflict strings

**Conflict strings** refer to episodes of violence arising from a discrete incident with singular or multiple causes. A single incident is then reproduced through violent confrontations that come in sets, often the result of clan feuding or revenge. They can also emerge when the singular source of violence at the outset triggers other issues or causes of conflict. For example, politically-motivated conflict can induce an episode of violence that fuses with shadow economy or ethnic and clan identity issues as it spirals out of control.

Many violent incidents cannot be examined as discrete events isolated from other causes and related events that enable conflict to change shape, produce more episodes of violence of different causes, or endure even after it is settled. It is therefore important to examine violent conflict in terms of its propensity to turn singular incidents into episodes of violence.

### Propensity of causes to produce conflict strings

The first attempt to identify and examine conflict strings was done in 2014 through an analysis of 2,758 cases of conflict with determined causes from the 2011–2013 data of the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (see de la Rosa, 2014, *Disrupting conflict strings in sub-national contexts: Experience from Muslim Mindanao, Philippines*). This pioneering approach uncovered evidence showing that while common crimes and shadow economies were the dominant sources of conflict in terms of frequency, resource-based issues, particularly land and territorial boundary disputes; political issues, notably competition over political office; and identity issues such as clan feuding or *rido* exhibited a higher propensity for inducing conflict strings. The propensity to induce episodes of violence was matched by a higher magnitude of violence.

The examination of conflict strings unveiled the distinct character and counter-intuitive nature of the violence landscape in the Bangsamoro. The evidence demonstrates that incidence does not determine magnitude, violence can stretch and morph, and actors can turn from victims into perpetrators. The policy implication is fairly simple and straightforward—development and peace building groups must deal with resource-based conflicts, identity conflicts, and political violence at the onset to prevent discrete episodes from turning into strings or morphing into new forms of violence.


**“...incidence does not determine magnitude, violence can stretch and morph, and actors can turn from victims into perpetrators.”**

- New priorities and approaches need to be explored by the security sector, national agencies, local governments, and the peacebuilding sector, those that match specific conflict prevention mechanisms to the nature and character of the conflict. Hybrid mechanisms such as anti-clan feuding coalitions or the use of traditional institutions of justice and the matching of these mechanisms to the nature of conflict should be explored to prevent the spread and escalation of conflict, which often result in higher human costs.

### **Multiple identities, kinship ties, and organizational affiliations: A case study of a 27-year conflict string**

- Aside from propensity of causes, actor identity and affiliation—clan, organizational membership, networks and alliances—may help explain why conflict endures or escalates. It can also be an indicator of the potential of a single incident to turn into strings of violence.



**Figure 7.** Violent conflict incidents by cause and region, 2011–2015

### Urban violence

It is important to underscore the emerging urban nature of violent conflict in both regions. The scale of violence reported in the cities and towns of the Davao Region and the ARMM points to the evolving role of cities and towns as theatres of violence.<sup>14</sup>

The heatmap (Map 1) clearly indicates that conflict incidence is highest in the urban centres of Cotabato City, Islamic City of Marawi, Parang and Malabang in the mainland. Conflict incidence is also high in the cities of Jolo and Isabela and the municipality of Bongao in the islands of the ARMM.

Meanwhile, the cities of Tagum and Panabo (Map 2), the city of Digos and the towns of Monkayo, Bansalan and Maco, among others, topped the list of conflict areas in the Davao Region. The data provides evidence that common crimes and conflicts resulting from shadow activities predominate in cities and towns, including some significant cases of clan feuding or *rido*.



Conflicts also converged in poor yet less disadvantaged areas rather than in areas that are extremely poor.<sup>15</sup> In Compostela Valley, the municipalities of Nabunturan, Mabini, Maragusan, Asuncion and Carmen, which are either first or second class based on average annual income, show a high concentration of conflicts (Map 2).

<sup>14</sup> The Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) (<https://psa.gov.ph>) classifies cities into highly urbanized cities; independent component cities, which are independent of the province where they are located; and component cities, which are part of the province where they are located. Cotabato City is an independent component city of the Soccsksargen while Isabela City is a component city of the Zamboanga Peninsula.

A town or municipality, according to the PSA, is a "subsidiary of the province, which consists of a number of barangays within its territorial boundaries, one of which is the seat of government found at the town proper or poblacion."

The PSA also makes a distinction between urban and rural areas. Urban areas have a population density of at least 500 persons per square kilometre or have distinguishing marks such as a network of streets, at least six establishments (whether commercial, manufacturing, recreational and/or personal services), a marketplace or any building where trading takes place at least once a week, and a public building such as a school, hospital, health centre or library. Rural areas are those that don't meet these requirements.

<sup>15</sup> Using Department of Finance Department Order No. 23-08 effective 29 July 2008, the Philippine Statistics Authority ([psa.gov.ph](https://psa.gov.ph)) classifies municipalities by average annual income into: first class – P55 million or more; second class – P45 million or more but less than P55 million; third class – P35 million or more but less than P45 million; fourth class – P25 million or more but less than P35 million; fifth class – P15 million or more but less than P25 million; and sixth class – below P15 million.


**Map 1.** Heatmap of violent conflict incidents in ARMM, 2011–2015**Map 2.** Heatmap of violent conflict incidents in Davao Region, 2011–2015

The data debunks generally held views about resource-based conflict, particularly over land, and identity-based conflicts such as *rido* as primary sources of violent conflict in the two regions. Nevertheless, some provinces can be distinguished for being the primary sites of violence associated with land and resource-based violence, including Maguindanao, Davao Oriental and Davao del Norte.



Compostela Valley, rich in gold and a lure for both big and small miners,<sup>16</sup> also stands out in terms of the so-called ‘resource curse’, evidenced by the province’s vulnerability to resource and land-based violent conflicts (Figure 8).

**Figure 8.** Violent conflict incidents by cause and province, 2011–2015



The data also indicates that identity-based violence (*rido*, inter- and intra-*lumad*, and gender-based violence) is prevalent in Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Davao del Sur and Davao del Norte; while shadow economy- and politically-related violence are prevalent in Maguindanao, Basilan, Compostela Valley and Davao del Norte.

the data suggests that

**more attention should be given towards resolving clan and other identity-related violence,**

including violent contestation over resources such as land


Meanwhile, the newly evolving threat of extremist violence is prevalent in Lanao del Sur, Basilan and Sulu.

#### Horizontal versus vertical conflict in terms of incidence

The preponderance of common crimes and shadow economy-related incidents of violence coupled with other horizontal or community-based inter- or intra-family, clan or tribal conflict has been the most critical feature of violent conflict in both the Davao and ARMM provinces over the past five years (Figure 9). This finding in itself is not new, having been a feature of previous studies. However, the data does suggest that more attention should be given towards resolving clan and other identity-related violence, including violent contestation over resources such as land.


<sup>16</sup> Nine of Compostela Valley's 11 municipalities are considered gold-rich areas.

**Figure 9.** Violent conflict incidents (including shadow economy issues and common crimes) by type and region, 2011–2015



However, the nature of common crimes and violent illicit economies that feature in the recent scholarship on crime, violence and instability (or CVI) also traces these incidents as part of governance-induced conflict. Hence, we removed common crimes and illicit economies in an iteration of vertical and horizontal conflict incidence, and discovered that political violence of the vertical type, that is, rebellion-related, became more significant. (See Figure 10).

**Figure 10.** Violent conflict incidents (excluding shadow economy issues and common crimes) by type and region, 2011–2015



### Political conflict leads to higher human costs

The higher number of conflict deaths associated with vertical as well as horizontal political conflict underscores the importance of understanding conflict in terms of magnitude—measured here in terms of human costs rather than incidence or scale.

Political causes and identity issues eclipsed the magnitude of violence associated with common crimes, shadow economies and issues related to governance from 2011–2015 in the ARMM and Davao Region. (See Figure 11).



## Box 3 | Measuring the economic costs of conflict in the Philippines

by **Charmaine G. Ramos** PhD<sup>1</sup>

**R**aging in the Philippines since 1969 is one of the world's longest running communist insurgencies in the world, a "protracted war" waged by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People's Army (NPA) against the government of the Philippines. This is a conflict that media reports estimate to have caused a total of 40,000 casualties,<sup>2</sup> yet as noted by the International Crisis Group (2011, p. 1) is also one that has not received as much international attention as the country's Muslim rebellion.

The relative inattention to the communist rebellion may be due to the lack of knowledge about the economic costs of the conflict, aggravated by the absence of a systematic method for measuring economic costs. Indeed, while a number of studies<sup>3</sup> have endeavoured to unpack and quantify the economic costs of the Muslim rebellion in Mindanao, only the Human Development Network (PHDR, 2005) has made a similar attempt in terms of the communist insurgency.

### economic cost of conflict:

the potential output loss due to the destruction of production factors

Addressing this data gap is now a matter of urgency. Development and peacebuilding organizations see the importance in demonstrating the significant economic and human costs of armed conflict in the Philippines as a way to strengthen the constituency for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and to buttress on-going efforts to negotiate a durable political settlement.

To address the relative inattention to the economic costs of rebellion, this paper critically reviews the literature on the conceptualization and measurement of the costs of conflict as a step towards understanding and quantifying those costs in the case of the communist insurgency in the Philippines.

### Conceptualising the costs of conflict

The difficulty and complexity of measuring the economic costs of conflict—defined as the potential output loss due to the destruction of production factors—is of course not unique to the Philippine case. Arunatilake et al (2001) undertook an accounting of the economic costs of ethnic war in Sri Lanka in the 1990s, and saw how pure economic costs were difficult and time-consuming to compute (Arunatilake, et al, 2001, p. 1483). This is probably why despite evidence of the growing frequency of both interstate and intrastate conflict in the twentieth century, empirical studies on the costs of war are scarce, and interest in measuring the economic costs of conflict is quite recent. Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2012, pp 9–10) state that "virtually all research on the [economic] consequences and costs of conflict has been published over the past decade."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Charmaine Ramos finished her PhD at the London School of Economics and is presently a Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Institute of Social Studies, Den Haag, Netherlands. The article is an excerpt from an analytical piece she wrote in July 2016 for International Alert Philippines on the methodology for assessing the economic costs of violent conflict.

<sup>2</sup> From <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17038024>, accessed on 16 July 2016.

<sup>3</sup> These include: Barandiaran (2002); PHDR (2005); and Schiavo-Campo, et al (2005).

<sup>4</sup> A recent collection of works that feature the state of the art on the measurement of the costs of conflict may be found in the Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2012).

The first important step to quantifying the economic costs of conflict is to define them. They are often subdivided into direct and indirect costs. Direct costs can be thought of as all those costs that are immediately attributable to the conflict, including monetary resources directly expended on the conflict and the value of all production factors destroyed by it. These would include conflict-related military expenditures of both the government and the insurgent groups; the value of physical assets destroyed due to the conflict, including the value of the lost future streams of returns from these; and all resources expended on resettling and caring for individuals displaced by the conflict.

Meanwhile, indirect costs are those arising as by-products of the conflict. These would include foregone income and/or output from domestic and foreign investments deflected by the conflict, lost tourist receipts, the extent to which military spending due to the conflict crowds out investment, and foregone output from the conflict-induced loss of human capital or resulting from the process of displacement.

Arunatilake et al (2001, p. 1487) caution us that important indirect costs may actually be intangible. For example, protracted conflict may impinge on the political ability of governments to pursue necessary economic reforms, particularly if these reforms alienate a particular producer group whose political support is considered vital to the war effort. Governments besieged by violent conflict may enforce news censorship to restrict the flow of information in the name of maintaining security. Conditions that breed corruption may thus also be fostered by conflict.

Schiavo-Campo, et. al. (2005, pp 4-7) warn about other indirect and intangible costs such as the emergence of 'ghettoes' in cities receiving the displaced; the spillover effects into illegal activities like kidnapping, drug trafficking that result from a worsening security situation; and institutional costs like a weaker rule of law, and the disruption of education and health systems.<sup>5</sup> Because of the potential significance of the economic 'bads' resulting from these intangible costs, there is a strong sense that even the best estimated quantitative measures of direct and indirect costs will always be a conservative estimate of the true economic costs of conflict.

### Opportunity costs

Violent conflict can engender 'opportunity costs' that in microeconomic theory is the cost in terms of foregone opportunity associated with the next best alternative. They are resources expended that have alternative uses, and returns foregone from the resources that remain unused or underutilized because of the conflict. (Mutlu, 2001, p. 63).

The opportunity cost of conflict thus relates to the foregone benefits associated with a 'conflict-free' alternative. Continuing to borrow from microeconomic theory, this opportunity cost could be further categorised into explicit and implicit costs. Explicit costs would involve 'out of pocket expenses' directly attributable to conflict. The explicit costs of conflict would include the military, the human cost of conflict in terms of deaths and injury, the monetary costs of care for the displaced, the cost

The relative inattention to the communist rebellion may be due to the lack of knowledge about the economic costs of the conflict, aggravated by the absence of a systematic method for measuring economic costs.

**Addressing this data gap is now a matter of urgency.**

<sup>5</sup> The view that war and conflict universally bring about malign developmental outcomes is of course contested in literature. A good view of the polar positions of this debate are provided by Hoeffler and Querol (2003), who see civil wars as "development in reverse"—very much along the lines of the literature measuring the costs of conflict, and Tilly (1985), who utilizes the historical experience of Western Europe to show that war was intimately linked with processes of state-making, and in this way not necessarily inimical to the exigencies of development and economic transformation.

of the physical destruction of infrastructure and capital assets—and all output lost because of the conflict. Meanwhile, implicit costs relate to the further value and benefits that could have been generated by that which was lost as a direct cost. For example, the value of returns on the military budget if it were invested elsewhere, or the income that could have been earned by those who die in the conflict are further benefits lost as a result of the conflict.

The economic costs of conflict also have temporal and geographic dimensions, and an indicative summary of these, by type of costs of conflict, is depicted in the table below. In terms of the temporal dimension, these costs may be thought of as having short-term and long-term impacts. For example, the destruction of physical capital represents not just a short-term depletion of asset base because it also leads to the loss of capital services over the duration of the asset's lifetime, which in turn has long-term consequences. While refugee care may constitute one-off costs and have shorter-term impact, any investment deflected because of the conflict has a longer-term effect as it foments a loss of future streams of output and employment. Similarly the disruption of human capital formation due to conflict—say because of psychological traumas induced by violence or conflict-induced barriers to obtaining education and health services in violence-affected area—may lead to the lowering of average work force skills, and thereby have longer term effects on output.

Schiavo-Campo et al (2005, p 4) propose a conception of these temporal dimensions rooted in the neo-classical economic conception of the costs of conflict. They consider the direct economic cost of conflict to be the loss of output relative to some initial equilibrium position, implicitly assuming that the output before conflict was at an efficient level; and that the (non-market) disruption caused by conflict relate chiefly to a change in the efficient level of (market-based) resource allocation.


In this sense, conflict is seen as disruptive of this equilibrium, and short-run output losses are seen to arise from the diversion, depletion, and destruction of the resource base caused by the conflict. Long-run losses depend on how quickly resources can be re-allocated to their initial uses to regain levels of growth before the conflict.

### Economic costs of conflict, by type, temporal effect, and geographic scope

Type of cost		Temporal effect		Geographic scope	
Direct	Indirect	Short-term	Long-term	Conflict area-specific	Beyond conflict area
Military expenditure		X			X
Physical capital destroyed		X	X	X	
Cost of displacement		X		X	X
	Domestic and foreign investment deflection		X	X	X
	Lost tourist receipts	X		X	X
	Loss of human capital/Disruption of human capital formation		X	X	




**Figure 11.** Violent conflict incidents and deaths by cause in Davao Region and ARMM, 2011–2015



As highlighted in the 2014 general report, the higher human costs emanating from political and identity-related violence must be considered, in the first instance, as the key determinant of developmental, law enforcement, and peacebuilding priorities and initiatives, rather than the levels of conflict incidence per se.

In terms of geography, one notices that Sulu has overtaken Basilan in terms of conflict deaths, indicating that conflict has become deadlier in the former (Figure 12). The Abu Sayyaf based in Sulu, data shows, had become more violent and more heavily engaged in fights with the military in 2015. But by far, Maguindanao was deadliest compared to the other ARMM provinces—as well as provinces in the Davao Region. Clashes between the government and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) based in the province, clan disputes or *rido*, and land conflicts claimed many lives. (See Table 23 in Annex A).

**Figure 12.** Violent conflict incidents and deaths by province, 2011–2015



## New actors are emerging

Thus far the set of violent actors involved in conflict included rebels and insurgents, criminal gangs and private armed groups, clan members and armed ethnic and tribal groups, and many civilians.

Indeed, both the BCMS and the SEMCD pointed to civilians as the main sources of violence rather than any armed group, rebel or criminal. However, the conflict database is unable to determine with certainty whether these civilian actors were perpetrators or victims as they could easily morph or change roles as conflict actors.

The data indicates the rise in deadly activities associated with the BIFF and the Abu Sayyaf Group (Figure 13). On the other hand, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)-related violence fell as its ceasefire agreement with the government continued to hold despite the Mamasapano tragedy that claimed the lives of some of its members (Figure 14).

## Box 4 | The threat of violent extremism

**Threat groups** in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), altering the conflict terrain that could result in more instability and violence.

The Basilan faction of the kidnap-for-ransom group Abu Sayyaf led by Isnilon Hapilon, a faction of separatist Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) led by 'Kumander Bongos', the Ansar al-Khalifah based in Sarangani and the Maute Group based in Lanao del Sur have all pledged allegiance to ISIS. The Khalifah Islamiyah Mindanao based in Lanao del Sur and the Sulu bloc of the Abu Sayyaf have allied with ISIS. In return, the ISIS has acknowledged the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan, turning the group into a rallying point for the black flag and its ideology.

Conflict Alert data shows violent conflicts involving the Abu Sayyaf had shot up by 75% to 77 in 2015 from the year before. Most of these clashes were vertical in nature, provoking military action because of the links between extremist groups and kidnap-for-ransom enterprises that sowed terror and fear among the public. Conflict deaths climbed by 9% to 84 in 2015 from the year before. (See table on the following page).

Incidents involving the BIFF rose by 28% to 69 in 2015 from 2014. Many of these incidents involved clashes between the BIFF and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) over land and other issues that had spillover effects on clan feuding. But the BIFF, which seeks a separate Islamic state and rejects the MILF's peace deal with the government, also intensified its attacks on military detachments. The year 2015, after the Mamasapano incident in January, was distinctive for the large-scale disruption to communities: the BIFF fought the alliance of MILF and government forces that wanted to force it out of villages in Maguindanao and Cotabato it had occupied to claim territory. Conflict deaths totaled 193 in 2015 alone, making up nearly half of the total since 2011.

In the first half of 2016, Conflict Alert recorded 22 incidents involving the Abu Sayyaf and 60 involving the BIFF. Already, conflict deaths from incidents attributed to the Abu Sayyaf have exceeded the total for the whole of 2015.



The Maute Group, which grabbed national headlines in February after harassing an Army checkpoint in Lanao del Sur, was entered into the conflict monitoring system in 2016 as a significant conflict actor. Six incidents attributed to the Maute Group were recorded in the January-June period but these resulted in 86 conflict deaths, suggesting they have the resources and capacity to launch large-scale and deadly attacks.

### Deaths from conflict incidents involving threat groups

GROUP	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	H1 2016	TOTAL
BIFF	49	10	20	144	193	47	463
Abu Sayyaf Group	59	55	87	77	84	120	482
Maute Group	0	0	0	0	0	86	86
Jemaah Islamiyah	0	0	0	0	10	0	10

Across all five provinces in the ARMM, **the shadow economies rank as the top cause of violent conflict.**



This suggests the necessity of further examining the economic foundations of violence.

The same goes for other groups that have emerged, such as Khalifah Islamiyah Mindanao, Jemaah Islamiyah and the Justice for Islamic Movement. While they have not been as visibly involved in recent violent incidents, the threats they pose must nevertheless not be downplayed. Zulkifli bin Abdul Hir, also known as Marwan, was an elusive member of Jemaah Islamiyah. Before he was killed in the Mamasapano incident in January 2015, he was reportedly among the four militants who were actively recruiting Filipino Muslims for ISIS.

For policy makers, relevant government agencies and peacebuilding practitioners, an important area to examine is the extent to which drivers of subnational rebellion are the same as those of violent extremism, and which are distinctly unique for each. Data across five provinces in the ARMM show that shadow economies rank as the top cause of violent conflict. This covers the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur where groups like the Abu Sayyaf, BIFF and the Maute Group respectively operate, suggesting that the economic foundations of conflict are a potent driver of violence both from a security perspective and a wider peacebuilding agenda.

Conflict Alert has played a significant role in providing such insights necessary for a nuanced analysis and tailor-fit strategies at the local, subnational and national levels. While the evidence base on the various drivers of violent extremism must be further expanded, what's clear is that there are similar patterns of violence associated with extremism and other forms observed in the Bangsamoro. This has significant implications on programming priorities and strategies especially where violent extremism is concerned. Relevant stakeholders may be tempted join the CVE (countering violent extremism) bandwagon and develop one-off interventions, but what's important to emphasize is the need to continue investing on more long-term developmental goals in order to effectively address the root causes of violence in the local context.

An ongoing Alert Philippines initiative to deepen understanding and analyses of the context and relevant actors on the issue of rising violent extremism has pinpointed the non-passage of the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law, which would have legislated the peace agreement between the MILF and the government, as one of the main vectors of rising violent extremism especially in the areas of Basilan, Sulu, Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur. This vulnerability is exacerbated by other factors such as widespread discrimination against Muslims, enduring poverty and socio-political exclusion. These insights underscore the importance of a settlement to retire the MILF rebellion and of continuous, unrelenting development initiatives and peacebuilding in the future Bangsamoro.

**Figure 13.** Violent conflict incidents involving the BIFF and Abu Sayyaf Group in ARMM, 2011-2015**Figure 14.** Violent conflict incidents involving the MILF in ARMM, 2011-2015

### Temporal characteristics of violent conflict

The causes of violence that drove the temporal features of conflict in the ARMM were the same as those in the Davao Region. These were common crimes, shadow economies and identity-related conflicts (Figures 15 and 16).


However, in terms of temporal trends there is a marked difference between the ARMM and the Davao Region. In the ARMM, the spikes in conflict occurred during periods of electoral contestation and before the start of school classes in June during the first half of the year. In the second half of the year,

the lean months before the main season rice crop from July to September were particularly violent. Identity-based conflict was also intense from July to August during the period of Ramadan.


Meanwhile, in the Davao Region, common crimes and shadow economy-related violence increased from December to March and declined in April and May. The rise and fall in the trend was principally due to fluctuations in shadow economy-related incidents. In contrast to the ARMM, the temporal trends in terms of resource, identity and political violence converged between January to March each year, and sharply diverged from shadow economy conflicts and common crimes starting from August and up to September.

A spike in political violence in the Davao Region in the first quarter due to rebel tactical offensives coinciding with the anniversary of the New People's Army in March was not seen. It is important to note that an increasing number of insurgent attacks during this period were non-military in nature and may have affected the level of resource- and identity-based violence.

**Figure 15.** Causes and mean number of violent conflict incidents per month from 2011–2015 in ARMM



**Figure 16.** Causes and mean number of violent conflict incidents per month from 2011–2015 in Davao Region



# Conclusions and policy implications

## **The 2011–2015 conflict data points to crucial shifts in the conflict environment for peacemaking and peacebuilding.**

One, it is clear at the outset that both the incidence and costs of violent conflict rose dramatically in the ARMM and remained high in the Davao provinces. The year 2015 was extremely violent for the Bangsamoro in contrast to previous years. Meanwhile, the slight decline in violence in the Davao Region has not assuaged fears of an anticipated increase in violence due to the possible intensification of identity conflicts between lumad groups as well as the mailed fist campaign against illicit drugs that started in the middle of 2016.

The spike in violence was unusual considering that 2015 was a year ahead of the traditionally anticipated increase in violence that frequently occurs during elections in the ARMM. However, the increase in certain common crimes such as robberies (up by 75%) and shadow economies such as illegal drugs (up by 22%) are oftentimes linked to the pre-election period. Meanwhile, the post-Mamasapano political violence in Maguindanao, mainly induced by government enforcement operations against the BIFF, is partly to blame for the surge in the Bangsamoro.

Although declining in absolute terms, common crimes explain the continuing high levels of violence in the Davao Region. There was also a marked increase in identity-based violence plus a spike in shadow economy-related violence.

The sources of violence noted above were flagged in the 2014 report that advocated immediate and effective peacebuilding and development interventions to curb these violent economies.

Two, in terms of conflict per capita and conflict density, the conflict figures for the Davao Region were particularly alarming. Except for Basilan in the ARMM, all the top five provinces experiencing severe levels of violence were in the Davao Region.

To be sure, there are several possible explanations for the wide gap in the conflict density and per-capita figures between the Davao and ARMM provinces. The simple explanation is that the low number of incidents in the ARMM represents reporting problems. Another plausible explanation is based on a survey study commissioned by The Asia Foundation (2006) that showed how informal justice systems (including *rido*) were often utilized by local citizens who would not report violent incidents to the police, and prefer to bring their grievances to their clan leaders, settle scores violently, or seek assistance from national political elites. The third explanation is that the wide gap is due to a reduction in political violence because of the ongoing ceasefire between the government and the MILF. It is important to consider these explanations when evaluating the data gaps on conflict incidence between the two regions.

Three, the primary causes of conflict deaths are political and identity-based conflict, even as the main causes of conflict can be found in shadow-economy related violence and common crimes. Basilan remains an important arena of violence, as well as Sulu, Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao, in terms of human costs. The same sources hold true for the Davao Region, especially in the provinces of Davao del Sur and Compostela Valley, although many of the conflict deaths are due to vertical political conflict related to the communist insurgency. (See Table 24 in Annex A).

Four, as a result of the rising incidence in criminal violence associated with shadow economies and common crimes, violent conflict is increasingly evolving into an urban phenomenon as evidenced by the increasing violence within the confines of cities and municipalities, and along the main highways and thoroughfares of both regions.

This is validated by the rise in criminal violence especially in the shadow economies in weapons and drugs. However, even the identity and resource-based conflicts, including land disputes that were previously a feature of agrarian and rural conflict, are increasingly being played out in the main highways and transport arteries of the two regions, or in centres of communication and trade.

Five, there are new vectors of violence and new conflict actors from criminal entrepreneurs, private armed groups, and violent extremists. Violence attributed to the BIFF and the Abu Sayyaf has been increasing, and the number of clashes between government security forces and armed groups that claim adherence to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other extremist groups has been rising. In the Davao provinces, clashes between insurgents, government forces and lumad groups is being fuelled by intensifying resource capture by insurgents, mining and logging firms.

A new threat was seen in the evolution of previous criminal gangs and rebel groups into adherents of armed groups that have dedicated themselves to violent extremism, specifically of the sort associated with ISIS. Armed factions previously aligned with the BIFF and the Abu Sayyaf have declared allegiance to ISIS and new extremist groups such as Ansar al-Khalifah and the Maute Group have emerged with extremist agendas. These groups will be a growing threat to peace and stability in Mindanao.

The policy implications of the shifting conflict environment are manifold. The pace at which an enabling law for the Bangsamoro is institutionalized will certainly stem the potential and gradual exodus of disillusioned MILF and BIFF combatants to ISIS-directed armed groups. A final political settlement with the Communist Party of the Philippines–New People’s Army–New Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF) will certainly have knock-on effects on the scale of violence associated with resource capture or inter- and intra-lumad violence.

These new vectors of violence and emerging conflict actors begs an important question: are peacebuilding strategies focusing on the right areas, causes and actors?



## Box 5 | Violence intensity ranking of ARMM provinces

The Violence Intensity Index (VII) was created to enable development and peacebuilding groups to weigh the effects of violent conflict by examining both its severity (incidence frequency) and magnitude (human costs) and to use this information as a guide for determining priorities and targeting interventions in conflict-affected areas.

The VII is an aggregation technique consisting of two dimensions: frequency and costs of violence. Frequency is simply the number of violent incidents. Costs of violence is measured in terms of human costs, which include number of persons killed and injured, and the number of families displaced.<sup>1</sup> The primary objective is to measure the intensity or exposure of an area to violence in a given period.

The VII values and ranking across the ARMM provinces using the most recent dataset from Conflict Alert comprises the first part of this report. The second part applies the VII to specific cases of *rido* or clan feuding from 2014 to 2015.

### 2015 marks the highest intensity of violence

The 2015 conflict data indicates an increase in the VII values of all provinces except for Tawi-tawi (Table A). The province of Lanao del Sur is particularly critical, exhibiting a 60% leap from 2014 to 2015, followed by Sulu with 20%. Sulu manifests the sort of dilemmas that the VII was developed to address, that is, the province has lower severity but a higher magnitude of violence. And though it posted the smallest increase in 2015, Maguindanao still remained on the top spot since 2012 up to present. Political issues in this province caused more injuries and deaths in the region. Vertical and horizontal conflicts continued to incur high human cost.

**Table A.** Violence Intensity Index (without displacement) by ARMM province, by year

Province	Ranking				VII values			
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2012	2013	2014	2015
Maguindanao	2	1	1	1	0.712	0.950	0.982	0.987
Sulu	3	4	2	2	0.394	0.473	0.286	0.343
Basilan	1	2	3	3	0.966	0.726	0.257	0.297
Lanao del Sur	4	3	4	4	0.230	0.481	0.180	0.295
Tawi-tawi	5	5	5	5	0.034	0.034	0.018	0.013

The ranking also showed the intensity of violence in the island provinces of Sulu and Basilan over time. Combat and conflict deaths figured prominently in these provinces as law enforcement operations against threat groups increased, particularly in 2014–2015. Lanao del Sur appeared to be less violent in the overall ranking while Tawi-tawi remained consistent in posting the lowest intensity.

Similar observations could be derived in measuring VII with displacement data (Table B). The provinces with high injuries and deaths also posted similar rankings in terms of displaced families. Maguindanao, in particular, posted the highest displacement of families in 2015, widening its lead over Sulu and Basilan.

<sup>1</sup> Displacement data is sourced from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Cotabato City Office. More updated factsheets can be downloaded from the UNHCR dashboard ([http://www.protectionclusterphilippines.org/?page\\_id=255](http://www.protectionclusterphilippines.org/?page_id=255))



**The following policy implications are evident:**

One, while dealing with vertical conflict the government must also address the emerging threats arising from criminal activity. Crime is on the rise, and more so in those aspects that are intertwined with Mindanao's many shadow enterprises. Violent conflict related to the drug menace is expected to produce a spike in violent incidents—but this time with an anticipated increase in human costs not previously seen in the relatively benign type of violence associated with the shadow economy in illicit drugs.

Two, peacebuilding and development actors must develop effective peacebuilding strategies that address the links between multiple causes of violence to prevent the morphing of conflict causes. For example, resource-based conflict often morphs into identity and political conflict in the Davao Region. In the ARMM, the morphing of identity-based conflict with political and extremist violence is emerging.

Three, peacebuilding organizations must invest in research, conflict monitoring, and peacebuilding advocacy and action in the major cities and municipalities of Mindanao. Peacebuilding initiatives targeting crime, violence and instability in the cities and towns must be given prominence and the same emphasis that is given to rebellion and political contestation.

Four, the massive human costs related to vertical conflict underlies the need to urgently arrive at a meaningful and inclusive Bangsamoro Basic Law and a final political settlement with communist rebels. The data actually indicates that the costs from political violence that is currently and dominantly vertical in nature can be drastically reduced by the final retirement of the armed struggles of the MILF, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the NPA. Hence, the quest for a meaningful and inclusive autonomy law containing the advanced autonomy embodied in the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law must be preserved. Actions to establish a bilateral ceasefire with the CPP-NPA-NDF and to hasten the resolution of outstanding issues in the comprehensive agreement on socio-economic reforms must be achieved as soon as possible.

Time is an important consideration. The roadmap for peace and development offered by the Duterte government must secure an enabling law at the soonest possible time to prevent organizational slippages indicated in recurring reports of a bleeding of combatants from the MILF or the MNLF towards more violently radical groups. A delayed resolution of the continuing violence between the government and communist rebels may lead to the sort of conflict prolonged by access to resources, rather than economic and political grievances.

To be sure, Mindanao may see a decline in violence associated with politics in the short term, but it may also see a sudden increase in incidents and human costs associated with the shadow economy, criminal enterprises and extremism. In a way, violence in general will not decrease in Mindanao, but will move away from political violence to common crimes and the shadow economy. This conclusion is highly temporal in nature, as the failure to legislate an enabling law may lead to violent extremism trumping the levels of violence associated with shadow economies in the long run. In the Davao provinces, political violence may wane because of a political settlement with communist rebels, but may intensify identity-based violence as lumad groups square off for control over the rich land and mineral resources of the region.

## ANNEX A

# DATA TABLES

**Table 1.** Number of violent conflict incidents by province, 2011–2015

PROVINCE	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
Davao del Sur	8,757
Davao del Norte	7,857
Compostela Valley	7,748
Davao Oriental	3,963
Maguindanao	3,094
Lanao del Sur	1,282
Basilan	1,192
Sulu	894
Tawi-tawi	297
<b>Total</b>	<b>35,084</b>

**Table 2.** Conflict incidence per 100,000 persons by province, 2011–2015

PROVINCE	MEAN AVERAGE
Davao del Norte	231
Compostela Valley	204
Davao del Sur	183
Davao Oriental	139
Basilan	74
Maguindanao	59
Lanao del Sur	25
Sulu	23
Tawi Tawi	15

**Table 3.** Conflict incidence per 1,000 square kilometres by province, 2011–2015

PROVINCE	MEAN AVERAGE
Davao del Norte	454
Davao del Sur	434
Compostela Valley	332
Davao Oriental	153
Basilan	74
Maguindanao	64
Sulu	32
Lanao del Sur	19
Tawi Tawi	16

**Table 4.** Violent conflict incidents in ARMM by year

YEAR	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
2011	892
2012	667
2013	1,109
2014	1,647
2015	2,444
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,759</b>

**Table 5.** Violent conflict incidents in Davao Region by year

YEAR	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
2011	5,911
2012	3,844
2013	6,763
2014	6,119
2015	5,688
<b>Total</b>	<b>28,325</b>

**Table 6.** Violent conflict incidents by cause and region, 2011–2015

CAUSE	DAVAO REGION	ARMM
Common crimes	7,114	1,036
Shadow economy issues	4,754	1,773
Identity issues	3,451	718
Resource issues	1,576	156
Political issues	656	670
Governance issues	203	123
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>17,754</b>	<b>4,476</b>

**Table 7.** Violent conflict incidents by cause and province, 2011–2015

Cause	Davao Del Norte	Davao Del Sur	Compostela Valley	Davao Oriental	Maguindanao	Lanao del Sur	Basilan	Sulu	Tawi- tawi
Common crimes	2,488	1,798	1,814	1,013	572	212	126	103	23
Shadow economy issues	1,534	1,324	1,318	578	661	407	283	285	137
Identity issue	872	1,490	672	417	348	209	89	53	19
Resource issues	450	197	608	321	80	17	40	16	3
Political issues	103	83	417	53	341	41	154	131	3
Governance issues	49	77	52	25	49	19	33	19	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5,496</b>	<b>4,969</b>	<b>4,881</b>	<b>2,407</b>	<b>2,051</b>	<b>905</b>	<b>725</b>	<b>607</b>	<b>188</b>

**Table 8.** Violent conflict incidents (including shadow economy issues and common crimes) by type and region, 2011–2015

	DAVAO REGION	ARMM
Horizontal	17,174	3,943
Vertical	577	533

**Table 9.** Violent conflict incidents (excluding shadow economy issues and common crimes) by type and region, 2011–2015

	DAVAO REGION	ARMM
Horizontal	218	460
Vertical	577	533

**Table 10.** Violent conflict incidents and deaths by cause in Davao Region and ARMM, 2011–2015

CAUSES	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	DEATHS
Shadow economy issues	8,150	184
Common crimes	6,527	320
Identity issues	4,169	615
Political issues	1,732	1,096
Resource issues	1,326	171
Governance issues	326	177
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>22,230</b>	<b>2,563</b>



**Table 11.** Violent conflict incidents and deaths by province, 2011–2015

PROVINCE	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	NUMBER OF DEATHS
Davao del Sur	8,757	522
Davao del Norte	7,857	499
Compostela Valley	7,748	707
Davao Oriental	3,963	367
Maguindanao	3,094	1,318
Lanao del Sur	1,282	554
Basilan	1,192	534
Sulu	894	550
Tawi-tawi	297	99
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>35,084</b>	<b>5,150</b>

**Table 12.** Violent conflict incidents involving the BIFF and Abu Sayyaf Group in ARMM, 2011–2015

YEAR	BIFF	ASG	TOTAL
2011	12	59	71
2012	22	35	57
2013	41	49	90
2014	54	44	98
2015	69	77	146
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>462</b>

**Table 13.** Violent conflict incidents involving the MILF in ARMM, 2011–2015

2011	23
2012	16
2013	20
2014	24
2015	17
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>

**Table 14.** Mean number of violent conflicts per month from 2011 to 2015 in Davao Region and ARMM

Month	Davao Region 2011-2015 mean	ARMM 2011-2015 mean
January	525	123
February	554	128
March	562	108
April	530	98
May	470	128
June	461	100
July	454	131
August	478	140
September	388	131
October	436	82
November	424	74
December	383	110

**Table 15.** Violent conflict incidents in the ARMM by cause and year

CAUSE	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
Shadow economy issues	257	170	349	452	545	1,773
Common crimes	95	60	105	269	507	1,036
Identity issues	126	67	97	228	200	718
Political issues	97	100	182	123	168	670
Resource issues	31	21	17	36	51	156
Governance issues	30	10	17	31	35	123
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>636</b>	<b>428</b>	<b>767</b>	<b>1,139</b>	<b>1,506</b>	<b>4,476</b>

**Table 16.** Violent conflict incidents in the ARMM by specific cause and year

SPECIFIC CAUSE	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
Robbery	71	49	65	198	346	729
Illicit firearms	86	39	149	145	132	551
Rebellion	74	77	126	105	151	533
Illegal drugs	48	29	69	107	131	384
Rido	62	31	57	76	57	283
Carjacking	23	21	22	74	133	273
Gender-related issues	14	14	13	100	112	253
Kidnap-for-ransom	33	24	59	48	54	218
Damage to properties	11	6	26	42	127	212
Illegal gambling	31	22	18	24	28	123
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>312</b>	<b>604</b>	<b>919</b>	<b>1,271</b>	<b>3,559</b>

**Table 17.** Violent conflict incidents in Davao Region by cause and year

CAUSE	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
Common crimes	1519	970	1,638	1,605	1,382	7,114
Shadow economy issues	628	682	1,048	1,024	1,372	4,754
Identity issues	961	324	423	677	1,066	3,451
Resource issues	556	281	275	286	178	1,576
Political issues	120	63	195	160	118	656
Governance issues	40	25	89	26	23	203
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,824</b>	<b>2,345</b>	<b>3,668</b>	<b>3,778</b>	<b>4,139</b>	<b>7,754</b>

**Table 18.** Violent conflict incidents in Davao Region by specific cause and year

SPECIFIC CAUSE	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
Gender-related issues	730	172	217	585	951	2,655
Robbery	283	383	585	634	569	2,454
Damage to properties	559	229	451	533	379	2,151
Conflict arising from intoxication	601	317	424	366	382	2,090
Illegal drugs	70	137	212	237	530	1,186
Carjacking	152	124	233	203	205	917
Predatory violence by paramilitary	356	158	140	160	78	892
Illicit firearms	129	116	161	176	234	816
Illicit financial instruments and transactions	100	71	166	186	145	668
Illegal gambling	80	143	162	127	153	665
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,060</b>	<b>1,850</b>	<b>2,751</b>	<b>3,207</b>	<b>3,626</b>	<b>14,494</b>

**Table 19.** Violent conflict incidents in the ARMM by shadow economy and year

SHADOW ECONOMY	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
Illicit firearms	86	39	149	145	132	551
Illegal drugs	48	29	69	107	131	384
Carjacking	23	21	22	74	133	273
Kidnap for ransom	33	24	59	48	54	218
Illegal gambling	31	22	18	24	28	123
Illicit financial instruments and transactions	2	5	12	31	30	80
Human trafficking	29	23	4	10	7	73
Cattle rustling and theft of other livestock	3	1	3	9	21	37
Illegal logging	1	4	7	2	7	21
Cross-border trade	0	2	4	1	2	9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>170</b>	<b>347</b>	<b>451</b>	<b>545</b>	<b>1,769</b>

**Table 20.** Violent conflict incidents in Davao Region by shadow economy and year

SHADOW ECONOMY	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
Illegal drugs	70	137	212	237	530	1,186
Carjacking	152	124	233	203	205	917
Illicit firearms	129	116	161	176	234	816
Illegal gambling	80	143	162	127	153	665
Cattle rustling and theft of other livestock	53	48	54	43	62	260
Illegal logging	29	29	41	34	22	155
Kidnap for ransom	10	5	10	8	13	46
Illicit taxes and toll fees including forced pay-offs	2	4	6	8	4	24
Human trafficking	2	0	1	2	4	9
Other Shadow economy activities	0	4	2	0	0	6

**Table 21.** Violent conflict incidents in ARMM by crime and year

COMMON CRIME	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
Robbery	71	49	65	198	346	729
Damage to properties	11	6	26	42	127	212
Conflict arising from intoxication	7	2	7	8	23	47
Breach of contract, bad debts and seizure of properties	4	1	6	5	4	20
Other common crimes	0	1	0	13	3	17
Simple extortion	1	1	1	3	4	10
Humiliation and bullying	1	0	0	0	0	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>507</b>	<b>1,036</b>

**Table 22.** Violent conflict incidents in the Davao Region by crime and year

COMMON CRIME	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
Robbery	283	383	585	634	569	2,454
Damage to properties	559	229	451	533	379	2,151
Conflict arising from intoxication	601	317	424	366	382	2,090
Breach of contract except land related, indebtedness and seizure of properties	42	19	61	30	30	182
Other common crimes	5	3	98	13	3	122
Humiliation and bullying	29	19	19	29	19	115
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1519</b>	<b>970</b>	<b>1638</b>	<b>1605</b>	<b>1382</b>	<b>7,114</b>

**Table 23.** Conflict deaths by cause, province and year in ARMM

	COMMON CRIMES						GOVERNANCE ISSUES						IDENTITY ISSUES					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
Basilan	1	8	5	5	1	20	5	2	1	4	0	12	22	7	8	8	3	48
Lanao del Sur	5	2	5	4	16	32	0	4	2	1	2	9	34	9	11	27	51	132
Maguindanao	12	2	7	15	20	56	2	1	4	9	94	110	59	10	37	58	115	279
Sulu	3	2	2	0	1	8	2	0	4	2	1	9	7	8	24	8	4	51
Tawi-tawi	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	3	1	0	1	1	0	3
	POLITICAL ISSUES						RESOURCE ISSUES						SHADOW ECONOMIES					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
Basilan	27	41	19	13	27	127	16	0	2	5	1	24	1	0	4	7	6	18
Lanao del Sur	0	3	9	1	2	15	1	2	1	4	0	8	1	6	6	3	5	21
Maguindanao	61	18	61	150	198	488	26	9	10	12	8	65	10	7	12	7	7	43
Sulu	34	28	89	64	56	271	2	6	37	0	0	45	3	1	3	8	8	23
Tawi-tawi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	3	2	10

**Table 24.** Conflict deaths by cause, province and year in Davao Region

	COMMON CRIMES						GOVERNANCE ISSUES						IDENTITY ISSUES					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
Compostela Valley	8	9	11	8	16	52	3	4	1	0	2	10	2	7	6	8	9	32
Davao del Norte	4	17	26	16	11	74	0	4	6	1	0	11	2	1	5	5	2	15
Davao del Sur	1	3	15	11	11	41	1	0	4	0	1	6	1	3	16	5	1	26
Davao Oriental	7	19	8	7	5	46	0	0	0	3	2	5	2	13	5	6	3	29
	POLITICAL ISSUES						RESOURCE ISSUES						SHADOW ECONOMIES					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
Compostela Valley	19	9	34	28	20	110	2	0	0	1	0	3	1	3	10	4	8	26
Davao del Norte	1	0	5	1	6	13	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	2	6	12	21
Davao del Sur	22	4	3	2	9	40	1	2	7	0	0	10	2	0	6	0	4	12
Davao Oriental	1	2	3	1	4	11	1	3	0	3	1	8	4	1	2	1	2	10

**Table 25.** Number of insurgent related incidents and combatants involved, 2011–2015

YEAR	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	NUMBER OF COMBATANTS
2011	319	3,597
2012	220	2,274
2013	338	3,932
2014	292	2,698
2015	306	2,482

**Table 26.** Mean AFP-NPA clashes, by month, 2011–2015

MONTH	MEAN	MONTH	MEAN
January	19	July	26
February	25	August	27
March	39	September	23
April	25	October	25
May	24	November	18
June	25	December	19

**Table 27.** Number of incidents involving NPA rebels, by specific cause, 2011–2015

CAUSE	INCIDENTS
Rebellion	1,216
Resource capture	347

**Table 28.** Resource capture, by number and type of equipment, 2011–2015

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	NUMBER
Trucks	53
Backhoe	33
Gold mining equipment	20
Chainsaw	20
Bulldozer	11
Payloaders	10
Sawmill	4
Container van	5
Generator set	5
Others	18

**Table 29.** Number of incidents involving NPA rebels, by hour, 2011–2015

HOUR	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	HOUR	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	HOUR	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
0	49	9	70	18	51
1	46	10	52	19	95
2	23	11	61	20	78
3	13	12	51	21	90
4	50	13	51	22	78
5	101	14	72	23	65
6	78	15	68		
7	61	16	56		
8	56	17	60		



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
## ANNEX B

# SAMPLE MAP OVERLAYS

To request custom maps, send an email to [maps@conflictalert.info](mailto:maps@conflictalert.info)



# LAND COVER AND CONFLICT BY CAUSES MAP DAVAO REGION




## Legend


<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Population Centers</li> <li>Common Crimes</li> <li>Governance Issues</li> <li>Identity Issues</li> <li>Political Issues</li> <li>Resource Issues</li> <li>Shadow Economies</li> <li>Roads</li> <li>Approved CADT</li> <li>Davao Region</li> <li>Mindanao</li> </ul>	<b>Mining Tenements</b> <b>Status of Application</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Application for Production Sharing Agreement</li> <li>Approved Exploration Permit</li> <li>Approved Exploration Permit (w/ DENR case)</li> <li>Approved MPSA</li> <li>Buffer Zone</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Denied but on Appeal</li> <li>Exploration Permit Application</li> <li>Exploration Permit Application (w/ DENR case)</li> <li>FTAA Application</li> <li>Minahan ng Bayan</li> <li>Proposed Minahan ng Bayan</li> <li>Relinquished Area</li> <li>Withdrawn MPSA</li> <li>Alienable and Disposable Lands</li> </ul> <b>Landcover</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Arable land, crops mainly cereals and sugar</li> <li>Built-up Area</li> <li>Closed canopy, mature trees covering &gt; 50 percent</li> <li>Coconut plantations</li> <li>Coral Reef</li> <li>Crop land mixed with coconut plantation</li> <li>Crop land mixed with other plantation</li> <li>Cultivated Area mixed with brushland/grassland</li> <li>Fishponds derived from mangrove</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Grassland, grass covering &gt; 70 percent</li> <li>Mangrove vegetation</li> <li>Mossy forest</li> <li>Open canopy, mature trees covering &lt; 50 percent</li> <li>Other plantations</li> <li>Riverbeds</li> <li>Siltation pattern in lake</li> <li>Unclassified</li> </ul>
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LAND COVER AND CONFLICT BY CAUSES MAP

**ARM (LANAO DEL SUR AND MAGUINDANAO)**



LAND COVER AND CONFLICT BY CAUSES MAP  
ARMM (BASILAN, SULU, AND TAWI-TAWI)





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